Social Ontology and Social Normativity - Revision history

Phismith at 21:32, 17 July 2020

2020-07-17T21:32:38Z

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	Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.		Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.

	Brian Donohue's dissertation on social ontology can be ~~founded~~ [https://search-proquest-com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/2384858974/fulltextPDF/3A37BE94D67F4171PQ/1?accountid=14169 here].		Brian Donohue's dissertation on social ontology can be found [https://search-proquest-com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/2384858974/fulltextPDF/3A37BE94D67F4171PQ/1?accountid=14169 here].

Phismith at 17:10, 1 May 2020

2020-05-01T17:10:36Z

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	Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.		Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.

			Brian Donohue's dissertation on social ontology can be founded [https://search-proquest-com.gate.lib.buffalo.edu/pqdtglobal/docview/2384858974/fulltextPDF/3A37BE94D67F4171PQ/1?accountid=14169 here].

Phismith at 18:05, 31 December 2019

2019-12-31T18:05:41Z

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	Presentation by Brian Donohue (Ontologist, Capital One, McLean VA)		Presentation by Brian Donohue (Ontologist, Capital One, McLean VA)

	University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm~~, January 27, 2020~~		:Venue: Jeannette Martin Room, 5th Floor Capan Hall, University at Buffalo North Campus
			:Date: January 27, 2020
			:Time: 2:30-4:00pm

	''Abstract''		''Abstract''

	Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.		Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.

Phismith at 21:17, 30 December 2019

2019-12-30T21:17:45Z

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	Presentation by Brian Donohue, Ontologist, Capital One, McLean, VA		Presentation by Brian Donohue (Ontologist, Capital One, McLean VA)

	University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020		University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020

Phismith at 17:46, 30 December 2019

2019-12-30T17:46:48Z

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	Presentation by Brian Donohue, ~~Principal Risk Specialist (Ontology)~~, Capital One, ~~MacLean~~, VA		Presentation by Brian Donohue, Ontologist, Capital One, McLean, VA

	University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020		University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020

Phismith at 17:27, 30 December 2019

2019-12-30T17:27:45Z

← Older revision		Revision as of 17:27, 30 December 2019
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	Presentation by Brian Donohue		Presentation by Brian Donohue, Principal Risk Specialist (Ontology), Capital One, MacLean, VA

	University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020		University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020

Phismith: Created page with "Presentation by Brian Donohue University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020 ''Abstract'' Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions,..."

2019-12-30T17:21:39Z

Created page with "Presentation by Brian Donohue University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020 ''Abstract'' Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions,..."

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Presentation by Brian Donohue

University at Buffalo, North Campus, 2:30-4:00pm, January 27, 2020

''Abstract''

Many recent accounts of the ontology of groups, institutions, and practices have touched upon the normative or deontic dimensions of social reality (e.g., social obligations, claims, permissions, prohibitions, authority, and immunity), as distinct from any specifically moral values or obligations. For the most part, however, the ontology of such socio-deontic phenomena has not received the attention it deserves. In what sense might a social obligation or a claim exist? What is the ontological status of such an obligation (e.g., is it an entity in its own right)? And how do people come to have social obligations or permissions in the first place? In this dissertation, I argue that such social-deontic phenomena can be accounted for ontologically in terms of the existence of shared prescriptive representational content that is backed by collectively held dispositions to monitor for compliance, and to punish (sanction, blame, chide, look unfavorably upon) those who fail to comply.